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“Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim”  
“In the name of Allah, most Gracious, most Compassionate” 
-Quran: The Opening (Chapter 1), verse 1 
 
 
The computer is most certain the best effective tool ever created for mankind. It has brought 
solutions and shortcuts in order to make life simpler. Because of its enormous concealment 
computers systems security, meaning the hardware and what is stored inside it, is threatened 
every second.  Our concernment is about how these threats and risks directly affect other 
computer systems and software. We need to be in control of how to improve the security, and 
most importantly, how to improve it without making it less user friendly. Before we actually 
can deal with problems, we have to survey what threats and risks we might face. We have to 
calculate and evaluate the likelihood of things which might go wrong and how this will have 
an impact on our system. In order to do all this we have to make use of risk analyses and 
security seeking techniques. 
This thesis presents CORAS analysis, which is a method for risk analyses, and Markov 
chains, which is a method for probability estimation. The context of the work has been to 
introduce the idea of an active relation between CORAS diagrams and Markov chains. We 
have seen through different scenarios if and how they can be related. The result of this thesis 
is a method including simulation of the system on the basis of CORAS threat diagrams, that 
produces the needed values to use Markov chains to calculate the probability. 
It is surely up to the readers to decide and evaluate the solution I present in this thesis. 
Hopefully will this be secondary to the contribution which I hope this thesis brings to the 
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When the computer became a common thing in offices and other parts of our lives, we felt 
that this was the answer to our problems. Internet brought new solutions, information was 
some clicks away. But these great things brought one big issue to the world: The need of 
security, and connected to that. How much security do we actually need? We know that too 
much security can have a negative affect as well. Systems of today are getting more complex 
each day, and our demands are also growing fast; the system should be more user friendly, 
and internet connections should work faster and more stable. All this does not make the issue 
of security easier. When systems become complex it is harder to build a security strategy 
around it. And our demands force us not to make security too complex: The stricter the 
security is, the less user friendly will the system may become. For example, will the users 
have to spend more time on accessing systems, and on the other hand maybe they are not 
allowed to access some pages on the internet as well.  
 
One thing is for sure, security around systems is of high importance for both companies and 
private persons. It is necessary for us to have the right knowledge about what the threats could 
be, and of course how to prevent them. The big question is therefore how the security is 
maintained; Here it is important to do analysis on how the system works and what the 
consequences are of the different requirements the system has for the security. Can the system 
function with a failure in a part of its system? What kind of effect will the failure have on the 
entire system, and if we in case want to repair the failure, will it then affect the other 
conditions? If it does, will it have any consequence on the running system? Do we need to 
shut down the entire system, or could we just terminate some parts of it? 
 
Risk analysis can deliver big benefits to a company. It is a systematic approach to estimate 
potential losses from threats. Risk analysis can be used for many purposes: In the project 
stage a company can use it to determine its requirements, or check which risk level is 
acceptable. Risk analysis can also be used in the operation stage to find out what kind of 
effect changes will have on the system, or to find the reason for some problems which could 
occur. In a risk analysis the key elements in each step are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. The approach to risk analysis can be divided into two types: Qualitative and 
quantitative. The difference between qualitative and quantitative analyses is whether we base 
the analyses on exact numbers or not. [1]   
 
There are many different kinds, and one of them is CORAS [5]. CORAS is a method for 
security risk analysis. CORAS was built with the aim to be a less time consuming and costly 
method for risk analysis. Here we examine threats, vulnerability and the control around this. 
What can go wrong with the system, what part of the system is most vulnerable, and how that 
can be prevented, and now how we can reduce probability of attacks? CORAS diagrams are 
an effective way to do risk analyses, it gives a way to calculate and rank the risk and that 
gives us a figure to follow. 
 
In this thesis we will be looking at Markov chains. Can Markov chains be of any help when 
calculating the probability in CORAS threat diagrams? What has to be done to utilize Markov 
chains capability in CORAS threat diagrams?  
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Markov chains are well known in the mathematic world to do probability equations, and it 
shows how a deflection in one state can affect the other state, or the whole system. Many 
analyse methods lead to optimistic predictions for the system, because they assume that the 
components to be independent. While Markov-analysis look at the reliability and availability 
of systems, where the components exhibit strong dependence. One basic thing used here is 
state transition diagram to show different states of the system. This gives an understandable 
diagram where one can see how the system reacts if a problem occurs in one of the system 
states.  
 
The thesis is structured in this manner: 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Introduction for the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 Background: Background information about CORAS and Markov chains. It will 
also give an introduction to two other analyze methods: HAZOP and FMEA/FMECA 
 
Chapter 3 Problem analyses: Here the problem description is revealed and the purpose of 
the thesis 
 
Chapter 4 Relating CORAS diagrams and Markov chains: This chapter will relate 
CORAS diagrams with Markov chains. Here we will do a case study and later introduce 
Markov chains in that case study 
 
Chapter 5 Method: We will give formulate a method for how to use Markov chains in 
CORAS diagrams 
 
Chapter 6 Implementation, design and tools: Documentation of the implementation, design 
and the tool 
 
Chapter 7 Discussion: Evaluate experiences and findings during this thesis 
 














“It isn't that they can't see the solution. It is that they can't see the problem." [3]. 
 
This is what risk analysis is about. We have to find out what the problem is, where the risks 
occur, and how to treat them. 
 
Risk analysis starts with a description of the situation which gives us an insight. Risk analysis 
indicates what the threats could be, the reason for them to occur, the consequences they will 
have and how they could be prevented. Normally there are five phases in a risk analysis: 
Context establishment, risk identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation and treatment 
identification. These five phases are actually enough to determine the result of the risk 
analysis.  
 
Risk analysis can looked as a sub-activity of risk assessment and risk management. In risk 
assessment we try to estimate the risk or consider what the risk is. In risk management we try 
to find out how to prevent the risk. Risk management is built on risk assessment. The five 
phases mentioned above are a part of both risk assessment and risk management. The first 
four comes under risk assessment, and the last phase of treatment comes under risk 
management.   
 
Three questions that should be asked in a risk assessment are: What can go wrong? What is 
the likelihood that it would go wrong? What are the consequences? [8] 
These questions help to identify measure, quantify and evaluate risk and their consequences 
and impacts. 
 
In risk management three other questions are important: What can be done and what options 
are available? What are the tradeoffs in terms of costs, benefits, and risks? What are the 
impacts of current management decisions on the future options? [8] 
The last question is important how the treatment suggested by the analyze-team will have an 
impact in the future. 
 
Further in this thesis we are going to find out how CORAS diagrams gives answers to many 
of the question asked during the risk analysis. But first I will present different leading risk 
analysing techniques in order to give a broader picture of how a risk analysis can be done, and 
how these techniques seek to find out the threats. Do they give us significant answers and if 




2.1 Hazard and Operability Analysis 
 
“HAZOP” is short for Hazard and Operability Analyses, and is a technique based on 
systematic process to identify possible deviations from normal operations and ensure that 
appropriate safeguards are in place to help prevent accidents. The technique makes use of 
guide words and is carried out by a team/group during a set of meetings.  
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The background for HAZOP analyses is the idea of how team approach to an analysis is more 
efficient then individuals working separately followed by combining their results at the end of 
the working period. A team for HAZOP analysis includes individuals from different 
environments and expertise. In order to achieve good and effective teamwork the number of 
members within a group should be from 4 to 7. The background of these members should 
consist and vary from project engineer, machinery engineer, instrument engineer to safety 
engineer. The group should also consist a group leader with some experience with HAZOP. 
 
When you are working with HAZOP analysis, a brainstorming is a useful pre-work activity.  
The guide words are used in HAZOP analysis to make this brainstorm process more efficient. 
The guide words are used, in turn, to all the parameters, in order to identify deviations from 
the design/process purpose. The deviation as mentioned earlier is where the process condition 
may depart from their design/process objective. The parameters will diversify depending on 
what type of process is being analysed and process intent.  
 
The guide words used are [9] [10]: 
 
• No – Abnegation of the aim 
• More – Quantitative increase in a parameter 
• Less – Quantitative decrease in a parameter 
• As well as (more than) – An additional activity occurs 
• Part of – Qualitative decrease (Only some of the design intention is achieved) 
• Reverse – Contradictory of the intention 
• Other Than – Absolute substitution (another activity takes place) 
 














The procedure for using the HAZOP technique can be divided into this [10]: 
 
1. Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage) 
2. Choose a study node (i.e., line, vessel, pump, operating instruction) 
3. Describe the design intent 
4. Select a process parameter 
5. Apply a guide word 
6. Determine causes 
7. Evaluate consequences/problems 
8. Recommend action: What? When? Who? 
5 
9. Record information 
10. Repeat procedure (from step 2) 











Guide words Deviation Consequences Causes Suggested action 
No     
More     
Less     
As well as     
Part of     
Reverse     
Other than     
Table 2-1: Table for HAZOP 
 
 
HAZOP is a qualitative analysing method which is primarily used for identifying safety 
hazards and operability problems of process systems, especially in chemical process systems, 
but it is also used in software systems. HAZOP is time consuming, and it is essential to have 
access to detailed design and operational information. HAZOP focuses on discovering single 
failures that could lead to accidents of interest. 
For more detailed study of HAZOP see paper [10] and [12]. 
 
 







causes and give 
recommendations 
Use all guide words and 
parameters in turn. 





2.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Failure Modes, Effects 
and Critically Analysis 
 
The term “FMEA/FMECA” stands for “Failure Modes and Effects Analysis” and “Failure 
Modes, Effects and Critically Analyses”. FMEA/FMECA is a method which is one of the 
most used methods for performing reliability analyses. FMEA is a qualitative analysis while 
FMECA is an extension of FMEA, and it focuses on the quantitative parameters on the 
probable failure mode. FMECA adds probability of occurrence and severity of failure to the 
FMEA process. This analyse method should be implemented at the beginning of the design 
phase. This way it would give more impact on the final design and identify potential design 
weaknesses. There is generally a smooth transition between FMEA and FMECA, we will 
refer to both methods as FMECA further in this paper. 
 
When performing FMECA analysis there are some basic steps which should be followed [13]: 
 
• Assemble the team 
• Establish the ground rules 
• Gather and review relevant information 
• Identify the items or processes to be analysed 
• Identify the functions, failures, effects, causes and controls for each item or process to 
be analysed 
• Evaluate the risk associated with the issues identified by the analysis 
• Prioritize and assign corrective actions 
• Perform corrective actions and re-evaluate risk 
• Distribute, review and update the analysis, as appropriate  
 
The purpose of FMECA is to take actions in removing or reducing failures, starting with the 
highest-priority ones. FMECA uses a worksheet to do the analysis, and before working with 
this worksheet one should go through some certain steps [11]: 
 
i. The system must be divided into subsystems that can be analysed separately 
 
ii. A function diagram has to be made that shows the dependencies between the 
subsystems from i), and how they are related together. 
 










































    
            
 




           
 
 




           
            
            




Even tough the FMECA can be time consuming; it studies every single failure separately as 
an independent event. FMECA is incredibly effective when it is used on system where single-
component failure is most likely to occur. One of the major drawbacks of FMECA is that all 
component failures are analysed and documented, and that includes even those failures that 
have small or nearly no consequences. This creates a large amount of unnecessary 
documentation if there is a large system that is being analysed.  




2.3 CORAS analysis 
 
CORAS is a methodology for model-based risk analysis [4]. It is largely based on the 
acknowledged Australian/New Zealand Standard 4360:2004 for risk management [17]. The 
goal of CORAS is to develop a better methodology for more precise and effective risk 
analyses of security critical IT systems. This will prevent companies to use large sums on 
security issues, and by using this methodology in an early face they will see what kind of risk 
exists, and how to deal with them. 
The methodology of CORAS can be divided into: 
 
- Identify context: Characterize the target with analyses, what is the focus and the scope 




- Identify risks: Identify threats to assets with for example brainstorming, and also 
identify vulnerabilities of the assets. 
 
 
- Estimate risk level, evaluate risks: All risks can not be eliminated, so we have to 
decide which risk that needs treatment. We have to know about the risk levels. 
 
- Treat risks: Identify treatment of unwanted risks. Evaluate and prioritise different 
treatments. 
 
As mentioned in these points, CORAS objects are to develop a structure to make well-
organized risk analysis. This framework can be used by any existing company to analyse their 
risk levels, and how they can be treated. Notifying the results of an analysis in such way that 
they are well understood by users can be challenging. To simplify this CORAS has a UML 
based language which targets security risks. The CORAS language offers treatment overview 
diagrams. Treatment overview diagrams may for example be used to provide a high level 
summary when presenting the main findings from an analysis. 
 
The CORAS language offers five kinds of diagrams:  Asset, threat, risk, and treatment 
diagrams. The asset diagram contents of what is valuable for the client and needs protection, 
the assets must be accurate so that the analysis does not fail. In the threat diagram we show 
something or someone that will do harm to the assets. It also shows where the vulnerabilities 
could be in the system and how a threat can act. In the risk diagram the consequences are 
estimated, and it gives an overview of acceptable and non-acceptable risks. The treatment 
diagram shows where the treatment should be placed to indulgence the risk. 
 
The structure of CORAS can be separated in three different apparatus: 
 
• Risk modelling language: both the graphical and the textual syntax of the CORAS 
diagrams and semantics. 
 
• Method: description of the security analysis process, and guidelines for making 
CORAS diagrams 
 
• Tool: for documenting, maintaining and reporting risk analysis results 
 
 
Working with security analysis can be confusing for many people. Most certainly it is because 
the importance of finding out the right target for the analysis. One should know where to start 
the analysis and how to follow through the whole process. This is important to know to 
actually figuring out the correct answer in the end of the analysis. Many people seem to be 
failing doing this chore because of lack of experience in this field. They also might start at the 
wrong end, or they can get confused in the middle of process around different equations. 
We will try to give some guidelines of how to use CORAS in a security analyses, this can be 
divided in seven steps: [5] 
 
1. To get the initial information about what you are going to analyse, you should meet 
the company you are going to do the analyses for, and let them give you an overall 
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view of the company and their goals of the analyses they expect. They should also 
present the target they wish to be analysed. 
  
2. Go through and sort out the information you achieved from the first meeting, and then 
set up a second meeting where you present your personal understanding of the 
information. You should make a rough, high-level security analysis. This will clarify 
any misunderstandings from the first meeting, and help you when making the more 
detailed analysis later. 
 
3. Here you will present a more distinguished description of the target to be analysed, 
and all assumptions and other preconditions being made. The client has to approve all 
this before you can go to step four. 
 
4. Here we put in order a workshop among people with expertise on the target of 
evaluation. The purpose is to identify as many potential unwanted incidents, threats, 
vulnerabilities and threat scenarios as possible. 
 
5. Workshop is used in this step also. Now the focus is on estimating consequences and 
likelihood values for each of the identified unwanted incidents. 
 
6. You will now give the client the first overall risk picture. This is important because it 
will produce necessary adjustments and corrections. 
 
7. This last step is best done in a workshop. You will go through treatment identification 
and address cost/benefit issues or the treatments. 
 
 
There are used different icons in the CORAS diagrams; this gives an abstract view of the risk 
analysis. The icons are easy to read and the relationship between the icons is straightforward 
and therefore easy to understand. The different icons which are used in CORAS diagrams are 
shown in the forthcoming figure. 
 
 
Treatment scenario: The way to deal with a risk 
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Figure 2-2: CORAS constructs. 
 
 
- Asset: Something that is of value for the stakeholder and requires protection. 
- Threat: A possible cause of an unwanted incident. 
-  Stakeholder: People or organisation who may be affected, or may influence, an 
assessment or activity concerning the target of the analysis. 
- Vulnerability: Weakness which can be exploited by threats 
-  Threat scenario: Something that can occur because of a threat exploiting some 
vulnerabilities. 
-  Unwanted incident: Something we want to prevent, since it can cause harm to the 
assets 




2.3 Markov analysis 
 
As mentioned in the introduction we will be looking at Markov chains. Andrei Andreevich 
Markov (1856-1922) was a well known Russian mathematician. Solutions for many problems 
in today’s science and technology would not be possible without his contributions. 
 
In mathematics, a Markov chain is a discrete-time stochastic process with the Markov 
property. Having the Markov property means the next state solely depends on the present 
state and doesn't directly depend on the previous states. At each point in time the system may 
have changed states from the state the system was in the moment before, or the system may 
have stayed in the same state. The changes of state are called transitions. If a sequence of 




Most of Markov’s works were committed to simple homogeneous chains1, he determined 
probability determined probability pα,β of the event xk+1=β given that xk = α , that pα(k) 
of the events xk=α  are connected by the simple formula 
 




Explanation for the formula: 
 
pβ(k+1) =  ∑pα(k) pα,β   
 







If let k = 1 we will get: 
 






Markov-analysis is something that has developed over many years based on work by Markov 
on probability. Markov-analysis is a special type of stochastic process2; this means that it can 
determine the future behaviour of a condition by its present state. A stochastic matrix is a 
                                                 
1   Markov called the chain homogeneous if the conditional distributions of xk+1 given xk were 
independent of k 
2    A process where incidents occurs randomly 
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square matrix whose columns are probability vectors. A Markov chain is sequence of 
probability vectors x0, x1, x2,..., together with a stochastic matrix P, such as; 
 x1 = Px0, x2 = Px1, x3 = Px2   
 
We can define a stochastic matrix like this:  
A matrix A = (aij) is a stochastic if aij ≥ 0 for i, j = 1,…,n and ∑j aij = 1 for 
i=1,…,n 
 
When a Markov chain of vectors in Rn describes a system or a sequence of experiments, the 
entries in xk list, are the probabilities that the system is in each of n possible states, or the 
probabilities that the outcome of the experiment is one of n possible outcomes. [6] 
 
One thing which is important to remember is that previous state does not effect the 
determination of the current state; we only look at the present state. The Markov method is 
especially usable for smaller systems with complex maintenance strategies. In larger systems 
it is difficult to construct diagrams, and that is a major drawback of the Markov method. On 
larger systems you can use a combination of Markov method and simpler quantitative 
methods.  
 
In homogeneous Markov models the failure and repair rate of a component can depend on the 
current state. This can create some limitations because of some assumptions.  
Probabilities changing from one state to another are believed to remain constant, and a 
Markov model is used when a constant failure rate and repair rate hypothesis is justified. 
Probabilities are determined only by the present state and not by the systems passed history, 
so the future state of the system is understood to be independent of all but the current state of 
the system. [2] 
 
As mentioned earlier most of Markov's work was committed to homogeneous chains, but he 
developed also theory on non-homogeneous chains. The difference between those two is that 
a homogeneous chains is characterized by constant transition rates between the states, and a 
non-homogeneous chain is regarded as by the fact transition rates between the states are 
functions of a global clock e.g., beyond mission time. 
 
Markov chains can be divided into discrete and continuous-time, where discrete can be 
classified as irreducible or reducible, periodic or aperiodic, recurrent or transient [2]. While 
continuous-time Markov chain is completely determined by its transition times and the 
transition probabilities, the state transitions may occur at any time and the time between 
transitions is exponentially distributed. For some examples of irreducible or reducible, 
periodic or aperiodic, recurrent or transient, you may see the Appendix A. 
 
R. A. Howard3 gives a nice description of Markov chain: As a frog jumping on a set of lily 
pads. The frog jumps from a lily pad to a lily pad with the accurate transition probability. 
We can illustrate a Markov chain as this: S = {s1, s2,…, sr} is a set of sates. The 
process starts in one of these states and moves from one state to another, from state si to state 
sj with a probability pij. This probability, pij, called transition probability, does not depend 
upon which states the chain was in before the current state. The process can remain in the 
state it is in, and this occurs with probability pij. It should be clear that, when a Markov chain 
                                                 
3  R. A. Howard, Dynamic Probabilistic System, vol.1, John Wiley and Sons 1971 
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jumps, the distribution of where it lands depends only on where it was at the time when it 
jumped and not on where it was in the past. 
 
Transition probability matrix4 is commonly used when working with Markov chains. This 
gives the probability that the Markov chain will move to state j at time n+1 given that it is at 
state i at time n, independent of where it was prior to time n. 
 
 











Here pij denotes a positive element. We can see that 4 ↔ 2 ← 1 ← 3 and 4↔ 2 ← 3. 
 
We can see some similarities in Markov chain and CORAS diagram, in sense of that one 
thing affect the other. In Markov analysis state changes from one incident to another, in other 
words: Some thing that happens in state1 affects state2 in some way. In CORAS we see how 
risk, vulnerabilities and unwanted incident have an affect on each other. 
 
We will in this thesis focus on homogeneous and discrete Markov chains as they do not 
depend on time. There is a possibility that for some large system where non-homogeneous 
Markov chains could be more appropriate, but we will not focus on that aspect in this thesis. 
The reason for focusing on homogeneous and discrete is with respect for CORAS diagrams. 
In CORAS we have been given the states where the transitions will happen, and time is not 
the most essential aspect of it. Markov chains with use of transitions probability matrix will 
give us the opportunity to find probability from a threat scenario to an unwanted incident. 
 
 
                                                 
4 A matrix whose entries are non-negative and each of whose rows sum to 1 





3. Problem analysis 
 
This chapter will give the main purpose of this thesis, and characterise the problem 
description. We will go step wise through where Markov chain will be suitable in CORAS 
diagrams, and try to figure out if that will make CORAS more expressive. 
 
We have seen two other analyse methods, HAZOP and FMECA, and how they work. It is 
only CORAS which show which vulnerabilities can cause risks using UML, showing the 
different states, what can occur when something happens. CORAS is also easy to understand 
for others because it uses pictures and diagrams to describe the scenarios, and how one thing 
can affect the other. 
 
In CORAS diagrams we analyse the system using four diagrams.  This gives us a behaviour 
perspective on how incidents can happen, who initiates them and what they affect. It is very 
important to find the right assets in other to make the analysis correct, if not the result of the 
analysis will be wrong. The asset as described above is something that is valuable for the 
client, and needs protection. It is the assets that are endangered by the weaknesses that can be 
subjugated by one or more threats; we call these weaknesses for vulnerabilities. All of these 
things affect each other, one thing leads to another. If there is risk for something to happen 
that will have an impact upon the assets, then there are some unwanted incidents that will 
make this happen. The cause for an unwanted incident is a threat. [7] 
 
Thus risk level is measured by either frequency or probability for the unwanted incident to 
happen and its consequence. The scale used can be high, medium, low or other scales, and it 
is called risk value.  
 
The similarity between CORAS and Markov chains tells us that the system will behave 
differently considering what kind of transaction it gets, like in CORAS, where the behaviour 
is different from one state to another state. The main aspect here is how to relate Markov 
chains with CORAS diagrams. The area where this could be done, as we have said earlier, is 
in step five5 of CORAS security analysis. Here Markov chains can be introduced to give exact 
and more elucidate answers. The client will then not have only the CORAS diagram to look 
at, but a more detailed description of the problem in form of Markov chains. 
 
It is in step five of the CORAS security analysis Markov chains can be altering. We are 
interested in seeing if it will and if so, how it can give more secure answer when estimating 
consequences and likelihood values. This is what we will be investigating further in this 
thesis. 
 
How Markov chains can be introduced in CORAS, is the main question. The minimum we 
need to know is the likelihood between every state in the threat diagram to try to apply 
Markov chains. This likelihood is essential for Markov chains. Markov chains can not help us 
to find the probability for every state in the threat diagram, but it can calculate the total 
probability from state1 to state2. Will this do CORAS more expressive and the probability 
estimation more reliable? Today there are probability calculations involved in CORAS which 
can deliver understandable answers for the probability from state1 to state2. Markov chains 
must deliver something more then just this, and it possible if we can take full advantage of 
                                                 
5  Guidelines of how to use CORAS in chapter 2.3 
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Markov chains in CORAS analysis. The introduction of Markov chains, if possible, will also 
make CORAS diagram more trustworthy towards other risk analyse methods, since they do 
not have any calculating methods in range of Markov chains. 
 
Sequence diagrams is a useful way to show how a system works, but such diagrams can also 
be used to show how CORAS works and how Markov chains will influence the CORAS 
diagrams. Sequence diagram simply display the lifelines of participating objects as they 
exchange messages in a single scenario. The life line represents the developing life of the 
participating object by showing relevant events that are important to the object.  
 
In this example we will only show the threat diagram, and then use sequence diagram to show 
how it behaves. Then we will introduce Markov chains in it to give an idea of where it is 










This threat diagram gives an image of a company whose employees do not have efficient 
competence. The employee uses his/her own personal computer which is infected with virus, 
and connects the computer to the company network. The virus spreads around the network, 
which then causes slowness in the system which further makes the e-mail system to stop. All 
these incidents affect the asset: Availability of mail system. The likelihood given in the 
brackets of threat scenario and unwanted incident are what the risk analyse team have 
obtained to. Markov chains do not give the likelihood that is given in those brackets, but it has 










Figure 3-2: Sequence diagram 
 
The square boxes with the name “Markov chains” are where Markov chains can take the 
given likelihood and use it to calculate the probability 
 
How the system works inside the square boxes is shown below: 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Sequence diagram 
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These diagrams shows us how Markov chains can make CORAS diagram more 
communicative by its probability calculations, if the full potential of Markov chains are to be 
used. The original threat diagram has no such advance function of doing so, and this makes 
CORAS diagrams more reliable with respect to the probability estimation. 
 
The introduction of Markov chains into CORAS diagrams is a new phenomena, and therefore 
we have no tool-support when introducing it today. We are not going to make a tool that 
integrates Markov chains to CORAS analysis in this thesis. But to give a picture of how other 
analyse methods and system have build up a tool, we can se at these links. These tools 
integrate Markov chains with other methods or systems, and they will give us a picture of in 
which direction we should be thinking. The tools that are available for using Markov chains 
are MKV and Relex. MKV is a program for analysing state transition diagrams using 
numerical integration techniques. For more details MKV visit www.isograph-sowtare.com. 
Relex uses also state transition diagrams, for more information visit www.relex.com.  
 
The Success criteria for which we will be trying to accomplish during this thesis are: 
 
1. The thesis should compare Markov diagrams to CORAS diagrams with value to: 
 
• Expressiveness 




2. The thesis should deliver a method integrating Markov analysis in risk analysis based 
on CORAS diagrams: 
 
• Makes it more reliable 
• Makes it more efficient 






4. Relating CORAS diagrams and Markov chains 
 
In this chapter we will look at CORAS diagrams in all of its phases and explain its purpose. 
We will also relate Markov chains to CORAS diagrams. We will use the case study to show 
how CORAS analysis work and try to insert Markov chains to it in chapter 5. This will give a 
wider depiction of how it affects CORAS diagrams.  
 
The example in chapter 3 is sequence diagram has shown us the main area where Markov 
chains could be used in threat diagram. With Markov chains we can calculate the probability 
from a threat to an unwanted incident. This calculation can give more precise and a more 
trustworthy illustration of the threat that is resting in the system. The probability will be 
calculated through Markov chains using probability matrix, and any one with math expertise 
can solve them. The likelihood needed to solve these probability matrixes will be calculated 
in our simulation tool. This simulation tool is not a part of CORAS-tool, but it will give 
guidelines of how to operate if we want to relate Markov chains to CORAS. When the 
analyses team has made the threat diagram, they will have the option to calculate the 
probability from one state to another. The probability that is plotted in the threat diagram must 
be accurate. Markov chains can not help to find the probability that is plotted in by the 
analyse team. Markov chains can only calculate the probability of an occurrence from one 
state to another, given the likelihood of the paths of both states. The probabilities calculations 
that Markov chains have the possibility to present are not given by CORAS today.  The 
introduction of Markov chains, if possible, will give many benefits to CORAS in means of 
being communicative, dependable and giving the firm who wants the risk analysis done by 
trustworthy calculations. If we can introduce Markov chains here it will have positive affect 




4.1 Definition of CORAS threat diagram 
 
CORAS diagrams are made step wise and new modelling elements are introduced based on 
careful consideration.  
 
A threat diagram gives a picture of what can have consequences on the assets, and to give this 
illustration it uses elements as threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, unwanted incidents, 
and assets. These building blocks are illustrated in figure 2. Threat diagrams have three 
different relations: initiate, leads to and impact. The vertices of the threat diagram are threats, 
threat scenarios, unwanted incidents, and assets. It is also possible to allocate likelihood to 
threat scenarios and unwanted incidents likelihood. [15] 
 
The semantics of how a threat diagram can behave in different ways can be explained in this 










diagram  =  ({vertex}−, {relation}); 
vertex          =  threat | threat scenario | unwanted incident | asset; 
relation         =  initiate | leads to | impact; 
initiate         =  threat  threat scenario | 
threat   unwanted incident; 
leads to        =  threat scenario  threat scenario | 
threat scenario  unwanted incident | 
unwanted incident  threat scenario | 
unwanted incident  unwanted incident; 
impact         =  unwanted incident  asset | threat scenario → asset;
  
threat         = deliberate threat | accidental threat | non-human threat; 
deliberate threat   = identifier; 
accidental threat     = identifier; 
non-human threat   = identifier; 
vulnerability set     = {vulnerability}−; 
vulnerability        = identifier; 
threat scenario       = identifier [(likelihood)]; 
unwanted scenario  = identifier [(likelihood)]; 
asset   =  identifier; 
likelihood   =  linguistic term | numerical value; 
consequence   =  linguistic term | numerical value; 
 
 
The likelihood given in every element of the threat diagram is decided by brainstorming or 
based on historical data. In unwanted incidents the likelihood is either determined through 




4.2 Definition of Markov chains 
 
Markov chains are used to calculate the probability of sequences, from one state another. 
When using Markov chains it is significant that we know the likelihood for each state to 
occur, without this we can not calculate the probability for the given sequence.  
 
There are three different paths, which are suitable for CORAS threat diagrams, from where 
the likelihood can be used in Markov chains, that is from one state to another, the likelihood 
for staying at the same state (absorbing), and the last is the way back to a previous state 










The likelihood from a state to another must be given in the path, in other words: likelihood 
will tell us that this is the possibility from this state to another. 
 
When calculating the probability it is essential to know the amount of steps used from one 
state to another. This amount of steps decides how the matrix will look like, and what 




4.3 Does CORAS threat diagram and Markov chains have common 
characteristics, and is there any limitations? 
 
We can think of Markov chains as a set of states, like a state diagram. We make this state 
diagram with respect for threat diagram as we convert the threat diagram to a state diagram. 
This state diagram gives a broader image of the means of Markov chains, and how they work. 
The state diagram shows step wise in which order the different scenarios can occur, and what 
the given likelihood for that is. Then Markov chains can use the given likelihood to calculate 
the probability for the whole sequence, or the probability from one state to another. 
 
As we have mentioned earlier the likelihood given in a threat diagram or the path from one 
element to another is determined through brainstorming or historical data, and even if the 
semantics above shows that it is possible to have likelihood at a given element it is not for 
sure that likelihood will be given in the threat diagram. We can not always get all the 
likelihoods that are possible to accumulate in a threat diagram through brainstorming. The 
likelihood given in a threat scenario or an unwanted incident does not always have to be in 
numerical expression, it is possible that the likelihood is given in a linguistic value like [low], 
[medium], or [high], it is also possible that it is given as  [1 per year] or [1 per 6 months]. We 
know that it is possible to make a numerical scale in the CORAS tool for the linguistic values; 
this scale varies from system to system. This scale can not be used in Markov chains because 
there we need precise likelihood. 
 
We will further in this chapter see if it is possible to start applying Markov chains to a threat 
diagram, and what can be done when the likelihood between the elements is not given. How 
to apply Markov chains when the given likelihood is only in the threat scenarios and 
unwanted incidents. Are there any common characteristics and are there any limitations? And 
are these likelihoods enough to take full advantage of Markov chains? 
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The idealistic threat diagram is where the likelihood between all of the elements is given 
through brainstorming, and it is in numerical value. When this likelihood is given, there is no 
problem if the likelihood in the threat scenario and unwanted incidents are of linguistic value 
or numerical expression. We will see if Markov chains can only depend on those likelihoods 
given between the elements. 
 







Figure 4-2: State diagram illustrating the transformation of the threat diagram in figure 3 
 
 
We see that state1 represents the threat, state2 is the threat scenario etc. The state diagram 
moves step wise further for each step. This state diagram is a direct transformation from the 
threat diagram; we can see the likelihood given in those brackets inside the states.  
 
The vulnerability elements from the threat diagram are not included in this state diagram. To 
understand this we have to look at the semantic of CORAS threat diagram. The semantics 
tells us that the vulnerabilities is not a “state” for it self, but indicates that the threat exploits 
the vulnerability to initiate a threat scenario or an unwanted incident. We interpret from the 






Figure 4-3: Initial relation 
 
 
This is the reason that the vulnerabilities are not to be looked as a state when transforming a 
threat diagram to a state diagram. 
 
 






Figure 4-4: State diagram illustrating the threat scenarios 
 
 
How can we take the likelihood given in the state, and put it outside to show that this is the 
likelihood for this state to occur? 
 
The semantic of CORAS threat diagram gives us these vertices: [15] 
 
[[dt]] := dt is a deliberate threat 
[[at]] := at is an accidental threat 
[[nht]] := nht is a non-human threat 
[[a]] := a is a asset 
[[ts]] := Threat scenario ts occur with undefined likelihood 
[[ts(l)]] := Threat scenario ts occur with [[ l ]] 
[[ui]] := Unwanted incident ui occur with undefined likelihood 
[[ui(l)]] := Unwanted incident ui occur with [[ l ]] 
 
A threat scenario can either occur with an undefined likelihood or with a known likelihood. 
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The semantic shows also the possible initiate relations, which are: [15] 
 
1. [[ t  ts ]]  := t initiates ts with undefined likelihood 
2. [[ t  ts]] := t initiates ts with [[ l ]] 
3. [[ t  ts]] := t exploits [[ Vn ]] to initiates ts with undefined likelihood 
4. [[ t  ts ]] := t exploits [[ Vn ]] to initiates ts with [[ l ]] 
 
We can see that in our example we are at initiate relation 3, our threat exploits a vulnerability 
to initiate a threat scenario and the likelihood is undefined. We can from the vertices and our 
threat diagram see that we have a threat scenario which occurs with a likelihood of 0,6. The 
likelihood l1 as shown in the graphical explanation is unknown.  
 
We have to realize that the CORAS semantics does not allow taking out the likelihood given 
in an element and show it as the paths likelihood. If this is the case we can not use Markov 
chains to calculate the probability. We have to go back to the brainstorming phase and find 
these likelihoods, and if this is not possible then we have no possibility to apply Markov 
chains directly to a threat diagram. 
 
When applying Markov chains to calculate the probability from one state to another, or for a 
whole sequence, Markov chains tries every possible way from the first state to the last one. 
Markov chain allows a state to remain in its given state (absorbing condition), and the 
likelihood given here can be used to calculate the probability. This is counted as one step in 
the calculation. Markov chains gives also a state possibility to have a relation back to previous 
state (reverse condition), the given likelihood for this is also used when calculating the 
probability. 
  



















The likelihood that Markov chains uses from these two aspects are also not to be found in 
CORAS threat diagrams, because these aspects are not a part of the threat diagram. There are 
two questions here:  
 
- Does the CORAS threat diagram semantics allow us to introduce these two features in 
the threat diagram? 
- If these features are not included, will it affect the calculation in Markov chains? 
 
We know from the CORAS threat diagram semantic that every element points in one 
direction.  
 
initiate         =  threat  threat scenario | 
threat   unwanted incident; 
 
We go from one state to another; none of the states preserves them in the same state or goes 
back to the previous. So this is not possible to insert in the CORAS threat diagrams.  
 
If we suppose that we can introduce a state that can preserve in the same state in threat 
diagram, how would this affect the likelihood that is given in the state from before? And how 
can we calculate the likelihood for the state to stay in the same state. 
 
We know that it is a possibility that there are some other unknown paths which is not a part of 
our threat diagram. So the threat diagram we present has likelihood for not including some 
aspects that could occur. This gives those unidentified elements for occurring likelihood that 













This is a part of the above state diagram, figure 8, with some modifications which will be 
explained. We choose the transaction from state 3 → state 5, and try to apply Markov chains 
to find out the probability for the transaction going from state 3 to state 5. The x here 
represents the unknown likelihood for a state to stay at its state. We have hypothetical given 
the likelihood between these three states.  
 
As we can se from this figure we have different paths from state 3 to state 5 and there is a 
reason for this. We mentioned earlier that CORAS diagrams only goes in one direction, and 
the reverse transaction is not possible. Another thing that is important is that the relation 
between the different states is static. When reading the threat diagram we must follow the 
path that is written in it, that we for example go from a vulnerability to a threat scenario and 
that goes further to an unwanted incident. It is not possible to assume that we can skip one 
step and go directly from a vulnerability to an unwanted incident. Neither can we assume that 
if there are two threat scenarios linked to each other and the last threat scenario is linked to an 
unwanted incident, and we can skip one threat scenario to get to the unwanted incident. These 
rules are static in CORAS diagrams, we must follow the given steps from one state to the 
next. Then why do we have a relation between state 3 and state 5? This is to give a clear 
picture how Markov chain calculates probability. Markov chain must try every option 
possible to go from state 3 to state 5, even if it is not given in the threat diagram. Since this 
relation is not a part of the threat diagram, we have given it likelihood 0. 
 
Another thing we comprehend from threat diagram that must be used when calculating the 
probability is the amount of steps taken from state 3 to reach state 5. We look at the threat 
diagram, figure 5, where it is used 2 steps from the given threat scenario to an unwanted 
incident. We use the same amount of steps when calculating the probability using Markov 
chains in this example. When we analyse figure 13 we must use the same amount of steps to 
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get from state 3 to state 5, as it is made in the threat diagram. There are three different paths 
from state 3 to state 5 are:  
 
 State 3 remains at state 3 and then goes to state 5 
 State 3 goes to state 4 and then to state 5 
 State 3 goes to state 5 and state remains there 
 
We construct a probability matrix by looking at the possible paths in the whole scenario. 
Since we do not know the likelihood for the different combination Markov chain has the 
possibility to evaluate, we have inserted the value 0 there. The probability matrix does not 
include state 6. The reason for this is that state 6 is the asset we are trying to protect, and that 






To calculate the probability for state 3 → state 5 we will be only using the matrix from 3 to 




The result is: 
P33P35 + P34P45 + P35P55 ⇒x*0 + 0,5*0,3 +0*x = 0,15 ⇒15% 
 
There is 15% probability that the scenario will go from state 3 to state 5. This calculation 
helps to give a more reliable answer of how big threat this is. But have we used the full 
potential of Markov chains? What we have done here is just multiplied the different 
likelihoods with each other. This could be done using any normal probability calculating 
method, by assuming that we actually do not need to suppose the absorbing likelihood. We 
see that all other paths then those given in the threat diagram multiply with 0. We have to 
make some changes if we want to use Markov chains on CORAS threat diagrams. If those 
features that are given in Markov chains are not included, then the calculation above is the 
result. We can see that we do not need Markov chains to calculate this straight forward 
multiplication. 
 
Before we see what is possible to do if Markov chains is to applied to CORAS, we will look 
at some other aspects in threat diagram where some interpretation has to be done before 
Markov chains can be applied. 
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CORAS threat diagram semantic confirms that that one or more threats or threat scenarios can 





Figure 4-8: Threat diagram 
 
 
We see that both ts1 and ts2 points to ui1. We se that the likelihood from at → ts1 is l1 and that 
l2 is the likelihood from dt → ts2. The likelihood from ts1 → ui1, called l5, and the likelihood 
from ts2 → ui1, called l6, is unknown. We know from earlier studies in CORAS that if we 
want to calculate the likelihood given in ui1, l3, we can estimate it by using this equation [18]: 
l = (l1 x p1) + … + (lm x pm)  
The p given in this equation is the likelihood in the paths. 
 
This equation is used when brainstorming or historical data determine the p1 and p2 but does 
not conclude what l is going to be.  
 
There are three scenarios that may come up: 
 
1. We have the “ideal” threat diagram for Markov chains, where all likelihoods that are 
possible are given. 
 
2. Either l5 or l6 is given in the threat diagram during the brainstorming process. We 
assume here that all possible likelihood is given, expect for l6. Then we can use this 
equation to find the unknown l6.  If we suppose that  
 
l3 = 0,6 , l4 = 0,3 ,l7 = 0,5 ,  l5 = 0,4 and l6 = unknown  
Then we can calculate l6 by transforming this equation to: 
 
l6 = (l7 / l3) – ((l4 x l5)/ l3) 
l6 = (0,5/0,6) – ((0,3x0,4)/0,6) 
l6 = 0,63 
  
We see that we find l6 by solving this equation. 
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3. If we assume that l5 and l6 are unknown in this equation then we can not solve it. It is 
not possible to approach this problem with a mathematical equation since neither l5 




There are two options that could be done if scenario three is to occur: 
 
• We have to go back to the brainstorming and historical data part of the analysis 
and try to find out one of the unknown likelihoods, if it is possible by looking at all 
of the facts. Then we can use the equation given above to find the other unknown 
likelihood. 
 
• If the above option does not give any results, we can not calculate the probability.  
We must do some adjustments if we want to calculate the probability. What these 
adjustments are we will be looking on further in this thesis. 
 
If we have an ideal threat diagram, a threat diagram where all of it its likelihoods are given, 
then how can Markov chains be applied? We know now that we have to introduce the 
absorbing condition and the reverse condition if we want to have full benefit of Markov 
chains. Threat diagrams are just a part of the whole system; it does not give the real picture of 
how a system is built up and how it works. We have to collect more data from the 
brainstorming face and from the historical data to use Markov chains on CORAS threat 
diagrams. We need some experimental data, like measurements, and simulate the system to 
get the values. This experimental data and simulation will differ from system to system, so we 
need to know which data is needed for Markov chains. To this we have build state diagrams, 
and if the historical data and brainstorming process does not produce the needed data, we 
have to execute some simulations. 
 
The state diagrams used in this process resemble those used when transforming a threat 
diagram to a state diagram, but we have to make some changes. We show all those paths that 
are needed for Markov chains with respect for the CORAS threat diagram, and make state 
diagram for each sequence. The relation between a threat and a threat scenario must be looked 
as one sequence and further on. This has to be done because we have to simulate each given 
element and its relation to the next element, because this is the best way to collect the values 
we need. This simulation will also test the likelihood given in the paths in the threat diagrams. 
Does the given likelihood from historical data or brainstorming resemble with the likelihood 
calculated from the simulation? This will show good our simulation is. This simulation helps 
with another thing, if the paths likelihood is not given in the threat diagram, then we can 
simulate us to find it.  
 








We first transform this into a state diagram with respect to Markov chains. 
 
 
Figure 4-10: State diagram transformed from the threat diagram (figure 4-9). Illustrating the different 




This state diagram is not just a direct transformation of the threat diagram, but it includes the 
likelihoods that are needed for Markov chains. Since this is the diagram we will be testing our 
system on, we have not taken the asset in it. The asset is not part of the system, it is what we 
are trying to protect. The deliberate threat is also not part of the system, but it has to be 
included because this is the source for this sequence to happen. We see that we have pointed 
out how we have to simulate every section number wise. This is because we have to calculate 
the likelihood for each section to get the correct answer. 
 









We have called the absorbing likelihood back to dt for b. The likelihood from dt → ts1 for a, 
and the reverse likelihood from ts1 → dt for c. We know that a = l4, but we will test this also 
out when simulating this scenario. Then we can se well the simulation went. Before we start 
to simulate it is essential to look at the historical data and brainstorming phase. We have to 
make some assumptions before we can start simulating; these assumptions are made by going 
back and looking at the historical data and brainstorming phase. The assumption sets a 
maximum limit for an incident to happen, and we use this maximum limit when we simulate. 
The maximum limit tells us that a given incident can not occur more then the maximum limit, 
it can occur less then the given limit. We make new assumptions for each time it is needed. 
The assumption are essential in this simulation, with out it we can not simulate to find the 
likelihood. These likelihoods are needed if we want to apply Markov chains to CORAS threat 
diagram.  
 
For instance if we think that our dt resembles a hacker, v1 is poor firewall and ts1 resembles 
hacks into companies network. Then we have to look at the historical data and through 
brainstorming determine for example how many hacks is possible per day. This amount will 
then be the limit set by the analyse team for the simulation for this case. These assumptions 
must be made for each new sequence we are simulating. 
 
The rules for how to calculate the likelihood after simulating: 
 
a: is the likelihood for state dt → state ts1. We must use the assumption made that sets a limit 
for an incident to occur. We then simulate this for a period of time, which is also determined 
throw brainstorming and historical data. We then add the answer we get from each attempt 
and divide it on the time period. This gives us the average, which is the likelihood for this 
event to occur. We can write this calculation as: 
m = (f1 + f2 + … + fn) / Nf 
 
m is the average 
fn is the result of each attempt 
Nf is the time period determined by the analyse team 
 
 
b: is the absorbing likelihood for number of times it was not possible to go from state dt → 
state ts1. We calculate b by subtracting 1 from a: 
  




c: is the reverse likelihood for number of times we got from state dt → state ts1, but was 
“thrown out” from state ts1 → state dt. The reason can be a security mechanism there that 
does this. We have to make a new assumption to calculate this likelihood. This assumption 
can not be greater then the assumption made for calculating a. It can be less or equal to the 
assumption for calculating a. We follow the same procedure as in a, and in the end find 






Figure 4-12: Second section of the state diagram 
 
 
d: is calculated as shown in a, but with a new assumption.  
 
e: this calculation is different from the one shown in section 1. Here we have to look at the 
previous likelihood, c in this case, also. In section 1 there was no reverse likelihood like here, 
so it was straight forward to calculate it. What e resembles here is; the absorbing likelihood 
for not going back to previous state and not going forward to the next state. We calculate this 
by subtracting 1 from the likelihood given in d and reverse likelihood, c, from section 1.  




We have to remember that if this calculation gives an answer which is in negative format, 
then something is wrong. Maybe our simulation did not go as planned, or our conjecture was 
not correctly determined. We then have to go back and see where the fault lays, and try to 
simulate again. 
 
f: is calculated in the same manner as c in section 1. The assumption here can be equal or less 





Figure 4-13: Third section of the state diagram 
 
 




i: this calculation is different from the one shown in section 2. Here we have to look at all of 
the reverse likelihoods, f and g in this case. What i resembles here is; the absorbing likelihood 
for not going back to any of the previous states and not going forward to the next state. We 
calculate this by subtracting 1 from the likelihood given in h and reverse likelihood from 
section 2 and likelihood for g.  




If this calculation also gives an answer which is in negative format, then something is wrong. 
Then we have to go back and se where the fault lays, and try to simulate again. 
 
j: is calculated in the same manner as c in section 1, but with a new assumption.  
 
g: is calculated by using an assumption, as done in j, but with a new assumption. It is 
important here to remember that g is the likelihood for the system going back to the first state. 
This depends on the system, how well it is built and protected. It possible this transaction is 
not possible in some systems, and then the likelihood is 0.   
 
Section 4:  
 
 




The last element requires some other interpretations. We know that this is the last element and 
it can not point further on to other elements. To find the likelihood of m we have to use all of 
the reverse likelihoods pointing from this state, i, j, k, in this case, and subtract it from 1. The 
answer of this tells us that this is the likelihood for staying at this given state, and we subtract 
away that part of the likelihood when it is sent back to the previous state. 





These calculations from the simulation give us the opportunity to take advantage of Markov 
chains ability.  
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We have earlier mentioned that when applying Markov chains to CORAS threat diagrams the 
amount of steps is a major factor. The amount of steps that is to be counted from one state to 
another state lays the foundation for the calculation of the probability. We have earlier seen 
that when we take same amount of steps that are used in the threat diagram, and when we 
apply Markov chains to it, we only multiply the given likelihoods. To get the full benefit of 
Markov chains we must try more then those steps given in the threat diagram. We know that 
when we simulate we produce more paths then given in the threat diagram. We have to use 
them to get the full benefit of Markov chains. We let the given amount of steps in the threat 
diagram be the minimum amount of steps, and the maximum is unlimited. We do have to 
remember that we have to follow the semantics of CORAS threat diagram when going from 
threat to an unwanted incident. Even if it is Markov chains have the possibility to drop some 
elements and point directly to the last element, we can not do that. This is because we 
presume that that the given scenario and its path from the first element to the last is fixed. It 
maybe possible for state in our simulation to point back to a previous state or to stay where it 
is, but it is not possible to skip one state and point to the next when. This is to preserve the 
idea of CORAS threat diagrams, that this is the way some thing can occur that can affect our 
assets. Because we simulate the system with CORAS threat diagrams as our basis. 
 
We will through the case study and risk analysis done on it with CORAS diagrams show how 
CORAS works. In the next chapter we will use this case study to develop a method for 
applying Markov chains to CORAS diagrams using the simulation tool we have developed.  
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4.4 Case study 
 
The reason behind this case study is to give an example of how a risk analysis can be done by 
using CORAS diagrams. What kind of information one should look for and how to use it in 
the diagrams. The way of presenting the diagrams and in which way they should follow is 
described earlier in the paper. We start with collecting the vital information for the analysis, 
and build the rest of the analysis on this information. The next stop is to create the diagrams;  
First we create an asset diagram which gives a picture of what is of value that needs 
protection. The second diagram is a threat diagram, this analysis what or whom can cause 
harm to the assets. Risk diagram is the second last diagram, here we estimate the 
consequences. The last diagram is a treatment diagram; here we give a solution for the risks. 
 
Post-Service is a mail-order company that does not have storage of itself. It is therefore 
dependant on continuous communication with their suppliers, each time they receive a new 
order from a customer. Customer files and records are considered critical information, which 
should naturally be kept out of sight of various competitors. 
 
The company requires confidentiality in order to maintain its marketing plans out of reach and 
as mentioned earlier, out of sight of potential intruders/ competitors. The last mentioned, to 
prevent outsiders from copying ideas etc. The input of harmful data, false orders or press 
releases that can lead to negative sanctions for the company is served and protected by the 
integrity. One of the other essential factors for the company is the availability for their e-
mailing system which is integrated with the customer service and CRM-platform. 
 
Firewall is also applied as a Front-end server for e-mailing, as well as it scans incoming and 
outgoing e-mails for viruses. The customer system is integrated into a CRM system with e-
mail connection. When an order is received by e-mail, the e-mailing system automatically 
alerts the CRM system.  At the same time the order is manually registered in the CRM 
system. Initially a booking of the desirable merchandise is been made to the supplier with the 
help of e-mailing services, is followed by an invoice to the customers. When the goods are 
received, they are first repacked and then sent to the customer. 
 
The analysis shows that the there are some elements is the company which can harm the 
assets, and what kind of risk they can develop. IT-infrastructure, mainly the hardware, is 
where threats can cause vulnerabilities to the system. There are also external threats, as for 
instants hackers. The main vulnerabilities which can create a threat scenario and further on 
develop more vulnerability which can cause unwanted incidents are: hardware error, TCP\IP 
stack and weakness in the OS. 
 
Hardware error can stop the firewall from functioning, which will distress the mail-server. 
The orders will not get through and everything integrated with it will be affected. 
 
TCP\IP stack vulnerability has a dynamo affect, it creates another sort of vulnerability in the 
system. It can overload the firewall and create denial-of-service attack.  
 
Weakness in OS can be exploited by a hacker. He or she can make use of the weakness in OS 
to take control over the firewall. This can develop into two new vulnerabilities, shutting down 
the firewall which will affect the mail-server, or using the firewall to further intrusion. The 
hacker can then monitor the traffic from inside and get inside information. This will give the 
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hacker opportunity to reveal the plans the firm has, or the opponents can take advantage of the 
situation because this is bad publicity for the firm. 
 
The treatment for these vulnerabilities are updating hardware, improve the capacity of the 
firewall and start using firewall software that controls sessions and using strong passwords 




















































4.6 Translation of the threat diagram: 
 
1. IT-infrastructure exploits vulnerability Hardware error to initiate Partly or full 
stoppage of firewall. Ex Disk problems or problems with motherboard with 
undefined likelihood. 
 
2. External threat exploits vulnerability TCP/IP-stack ( it has no internal security 
engine) to initiate Denial-of-service. Overload of firewall, the logs gets full. The 
external threat sends more packages then what the firewall can handle with 
undefined likelihood. 
 
3. External threat exploits vulnerability Weakness in OS to initiate Hacker attack 
Exploits known errors in OS or in the firmware of the firewall. This gives the 
control over the firewall with undefined likelihood. 
 
4. Partly or full stoppage of firewall. Ex Disk problems or problems with 
motherboard leads to Problems with external mail with undefined likelihood. 
 
5. Denial-of-service. Overload of firewall, the logs gets full. The external threat 
sends more packages then what the firewall can handle leads to Problems with 
external mail with undefined likelihood, due to vulnerability Slowness in the system 
and vulnerable to more threats. 
 
6. Hacker attack. Exploits known errors in OS or in the firmware of the firewall. 
This gives the control over the firewall leads to Problems with external mail, due 
to vulnerability Shutting down the firewall. 
 
7. Hacker attack. Exploits known errors in OS or in the firmware of the firewall. 
This gives the control over the firewall leads to Monitor traffic from inside and 
get inside info, due to vulnerability Can use the firewall to further intrusion 
 
8. Problems with external mail leads to Orders are not getting, everything 
integrated to it is getting affected with a likelihood of 0,5. 
 
9. Monitor traffic from inside and get inside info leads to Opponents can take 
advantage of the situation. That the system is not secure enough, bad publicity 
with a likelihood of 0,2. 
 
10. Monitor traffic from inside and get inside info leads to Disclosure of plans with a 
likelihood of 0,3. 
 
11. Orders are not getting, everything integrated to it is getting affected impacts 
Availability of mail system with undefined consequence. 
 
12. Orders are not getting, everything integrated to it is getting affected impacts 
Integrity with undefined consequence. 
 
13. Opponents can take advantage of the situation. That the system is not secure 
enough, bad publicity impacts Integrity with undefined likelihood. 
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When using CORAS diagrams in risk analysis there is no standard calculation method 
integrated today. It is up to every risk analyse team to decide how they want to calculate the 
likelihood, if it is necessary.  
 
There is significance of one thing when calculating the probability in CORAS diagrams, it is 
that the likelihood for the different scenarios must be given. Then this likelihood can be used 
to calculate the probability for the whole scenario, or from one state to another. The state 
diagram gives a finer picture of how Markov chains will work. Markov chains then take this 
likelihood given in those different states and plots them in a transition matrix. This transition 
matrix uses an equation to calculate the probability for the chosen scenario. 
 
There are some complexities in this equation when the quantity of states and scenarios gets 
greater, and sum of steps that must be used gets greater too. We will then be using a great 
time to solving the equations. We know that if we are to only use the given path’s in the threat 
diagram, we will only multiply the different path’s likelihood. But if we simulate the system 
according to Markov chains we get many other paths and their likelihood, which is not a part 
of the original threat diagram. We can use them to calculate the probability by applying 






We apply this approach of simulating the system as the different scenarios are shown in the 
threat diagram of the case study. We will then apply Markov chains to it in order to calculate 






























We have drawn a grey line to illustrate that the last three states, K L M, will not be used in the 
calculation of probability. This is because these three states represent the assets, and we 
measure the relationship between them and the previous states in consequences and not in 
likelihood. We do not exclude them from the state diagram, because they do give a picture of 
which state does affect the asset and with what probability after we have calculated it. 
 
We now transform the state diagram into a new state diagram with those paths that are needed 
for applying Markov chains. The likelihoods for these paths will be calculated through 
simulation. Before we transform into what is needed for the simulation we have to look at 
some aspects of the threat diagram. We can see that there are two different threats at the 
starting point; those threats initiate different threat scenarios with probably different 
likelihoods, which then lead to either same unwanted incident, and one of threats also leads to 
two other unwanted incidents. This can also be seen in our state diagram. Since there are two 
different start states, and even if they lead to the same end state, it gives an indication that we 
have to treat them separately when applying Markov chains to it.  
 
In Markov chains it is not possible to calculate probability for sequences that have different 
start states. We now have to segregate the state diagram in different sub state diagrams so that 
we can simulate correctly. We have to do this with having the original threat diagram in our 
mind, to avoid making new sequences which are not a part of the original one. 
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When we simulate we have to treat every sequence separately. What we mean here is we can 
see state B pointing at state D and E, state E point further on to state F and state G. We have 
to divide them into different sections so that the states B → D → F → H is a separate 
sequence, and sates B → E → F → H are separate. Every time a state point at two different 
states, we treat them separately. This is done because when we simulate we have to see how 
the system reacts to those different states. When more then one state points to the same state, 
or when one state points to two different states we have to treat them as different sequences. 
 
 
The different sub state diagrams looks like this: 
 
 
Figure 5-2: First sub state diagram 
 
 
The likelihood between state F and state H is given as 0,6 but as we see in this state diagram it 
is not given here. The reason for this is to calculate this also by simulation and then se if we 
get a value around what is given in the threat diagram. Then we can see how accurate our 
simulation is by comparing it with the assumption by brainstorming and historical data. This 























These separations show how Markov chains work, how the system has to be divided if we 
want use Markov chains to it, and when we want to simulate it with respect to both CORAS 
threat diagrams and Markov chains. Each sub state diagram is looked individually and they do 
not influence each other at any time. If we see that two sub state diagrams uses the same 
states and their assumption are also be the same, then it is not necessary to simulate them 
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again. We can reuse the likelihood found in the previous sub state diagram. Even here we 
look at them separately, but use their result because they look a like and their assumptions are 
the same.   
 
The rule we apply for the assumptions when simulating is:  
 
If we give an assumption for finding the likelihood a, then the assumption for finding c can 
not be greater then a. The assumption for d can not be greater then a, and the sum of 
assumptions for finding f and g can not be greater then the assumption of d. The assumption 
for h can not be greater then the assumption for d, while the sum of assumptions for j, k, l can 
not be greater then h. 
 
Assumption c ≤ Assumption a 
Assumption d ≤ Assumption a 
Sum of assumptions (f + g) ≤ Assumption d 
Assumption h ≤ Assumption d 
Sum of assumptions (j + k + l) ≤ Assumption h 
 
The likelihood for each path is found through simulation by applying the rules given above 
and those given in chapter 4 to calculate them. It is as mentioned in chapter 4 important that 
we simulate with an exact assumption. The likelihood for the different paths given in these 
sub state diagrams must be calculated; if they are not then it is not possible to apply Markov 
chains as intended. We will always make new assumption for the direct path line and for the 
reverse paths.  
 
We will use our simulation tool on these sub state diagrams. It works in this manner that it 
takes the assumptions for those paths that are needed and does a random check. If an 
assumption is that it is possible to go from state 1 to state 2 five times a day, then the 
simulation tool tries this five times a day. We also have to put in maximum value of time for 
how many days, hours, months or years we want to simulate. Then this is simulated for this 
period of time. The answer we get will then be inserted in the probability matrix of Markov 
chains, and in the end use the equation to find the probability. We will here again see that if 
we chose the minimum amount of steps, that are those taken from the CORAS threat diagram, 
we will only multiply those likelihoods in the path between all the states. This simple 
multiplication does not use the full advantage of Markov chains. It is when we exceed the 
minimum of amount of steps we can see the potential of Markov chains. It is up to each 
analyse team to decide number of steps they want to use when applying Markov chains, but 
the least amount of steps is that taken from the threat diagram. 
 
We start the simulation with the first sub state diagram. To explain how the simulation is 
done, and the assumption made for the simulation we will go step wise through each sub state 
diagram. 
 
To give an understandable picture we divide the sub state diagrams into sections, and simulate 
each section step wise. In this simulation we have decided that the time period of the 
simulation is 20  years.  
 
 






Figure 5-7: Section one of the first sub state diagram 
 
 
State A: IT-infrastructure 
State C: Partly or full stoppage of the firewall, ex. Disk problems or mother board 
 
a:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state A to state C, in other words an 
occurrences of a problem 
 
- Assumption: The firewall has 2 RAID disks but not of the best quality. It is possible 
that one or both of them will fail and this will include a partly or full stop of the 
firewall, this can occur maximum 8 times in a year. 
 
c:  
- Explanation: We went from state A to state C, but because of a backup mechanism we 
were thrown out and sent back to state A.  
 
- Assumption: The firewall computer is in a cluster. With a primary and secondary 
system. So when we for example get a total disk crash on the primary system, the 
backup system will replace it. Since the backup system will only kick in when the 
primary firewall system fails, the maximum number of times the backup system will 
kick in cannot exceed more then the primary system can fail. In other words c cannot 
be larger then a. But when the secondary system also fails for example in a core 
software problem then the primary and secondary systems will fail so we go to state  
C. Therefore in a good system likelihood c should be as high as likelihood a, but in 
our case we have poor maintenance on the infrastructure and it is not for sure that the 
backup system will always kick in on time, so we assume the maximum number of 
times the backup system will work is 3 times 
 
 
b:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state A to state C. This can for 
example be that we have a power failure, and the primary system is affected, but since 
the company has a backup generator which kicks in or UPS, we still have a failure of 
the infrastructure, but it’s working on a backup system. 
 











Figure 5-8: Section two of the first sub state diagram 
 
 
State C: Partly of full stoppage of firewall, ex. Disk problems or mother board 




- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state C to state F. 
 
- Assumption: There has been a total failure of the firewall, both primary and secondary 
systems are down. There is now a problem with the external mail. This cannot occur 
more times then the firewall is down, so d cannot be higher then a.  
Note. We assume that the mail will only fail when the firewalls will fail. This can 
occur maximum 7 times.  
 
f and g:  
- Explanation for f: We went from state C to state F, but because of some sort of 
security mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state C.  
 
- Explanation for g: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state A from 
state F. 
 
- Assumption: When there has been a total failure of the firewalls, we will have problem 
with mail. Normally the firewall functions as a front-end server and it scans all 
incoming and outgoing e-mail for virus and spam, in addition to a DNS server. 
Because the way the infrastructure is configured, we have these scenarios.  
 
o Scenario 1: Total mail server crash.  
 
o Scenario 2: Incoming mail will function ( g ).  
 
o Scenario 3: Outgoing mail will be pending and waiting for the firewall ( f ) 
 
g and f cannot be higher then d. We assume that g is maximum 1 times and f is 
maximum 2 times 
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e:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state C to state F, and not going back 
from state C to state A. There can be many reasons for this not to occur.  
 












State F: Problems with mail 




- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state F to state H. 
 
- Assumption:  Mail problems leads to this and this may occur maximum of 6 times.  
 
j: 
- Explanation: We went from state F to state H, but some security mechanism sent us 
back to state F. 
 
- Assumption: In this scenario our CRM system is queuing the mails and waiting for it 
to start again. This can occur maximum 2 times.  
 
i:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state F to state H, and not going back 
from state F to state C and state A.   
 




- Explanation: We went from state F to state H, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state C.  
 
- Assumption: We assume that the CRM system has to get external data, and since the 
firewall is down, we do not have the correct tcp/ip connections, and therefore the 
CRM system will wait for the firewall to go up. This can be maximum 1 times. 
 
l: 
- Explanation: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state A from state H. 
 
- Assumption: We use fax machines or other equipments to inform new clients and 
supplier about the problem and try to collect the orders manually. The orders will then 
later be registered in the CRM-system and the bill will be sent after this. This is not 
the ideal situation for the firm, but this is done for important customers and orders. 


















- Explanation: The likelihood for staying at state H. We see that state H is the last state, 
and it is only possible to go back. 
 




















State B: External Threat 
State D: Denial-of-service 
 
a:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state B to state D. 
 
- Assumption:  A hacker can use attack the system using a Denial of Service (DoS ) 
method and overload the firewall. Since Post-Service is not a large company, we 




- Explanation: We went from state B to state D, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state B.  
 
- Assumption: We have a firewall that has some protection against Denial-of-Service 
attack, it has the ability to stop request from single ip addresses. But when there are 
more then 20 sources of ip addresses the firewall cannot distinguish between large 
load and a Denial-of-Service attack. We therefore assume that our firewall can 
maximum do this 4 times. 
 
b:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state A to state C, because it was not 
possible.  
 











Figure 5-12: Section two of the second sub state diagram 
 
 
State D: Denial-of-service 
State F: Problems with mail 
 
d:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state D to state F. 
 
- Assumption: Since the hacker wants to use the mail server as a host for sending spam, 
the SMTP part of the mail server is affected, and outgoing mail will not work. This is 
done to the exploit of the firewall. This can maximum of 8 times.  
 
f and g:  
- Explanation for f: We went from state D to state F, but because of some sort of 
security mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state D.  
 
-  Explanation for g: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from 
state F. 
 
- Assumption: When there has been an attack and the firewall is breached, we will have 
problem with mail. Since there is an attack to exploit the mail server. We have these 
scenarios.  
 
o Scenario 1: Total mail server crash.  
 
o Scenario 2: Incoming mail will function ( g ).  
 
o Scenario 3: Outgoing mails will not work completely because of the load on 
the server ( f ) 
 
The mail server will either stop up or not function in the right manner. But the incoming 
mail will function. This is the likelihood g. The maximum number for g to occur is 2 
times. 
 
The outgoing mail will go through sometimes and sometime not, depending on the 





e:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state D to state F, and going not back 
from state D to state B. There can be many reasons for this not to occur.  
 





Figure 5-13: Section three of the second sub state diagram 
 
    
State F: Problems with mail 
State H: Orders are not getting through, everything integrated to is affected  
 
h:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state F to state H. 
 
- Assumption:  Mail problems lead to this and this can occur maximum of 6 times. 
 
j: 
- Explanation: We went from state F to state H, but some security mechanism sent us 
back to state F. 
 
- Assumption:  In this scenario our CRM system is queuing the mails and waiting for it 
to start again. This can occur maximum 2 times.  
 
i:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state F to state H, and not going back 
from state F to state D, state A and state E.   
 
- Calculation: i = 1- h – f - g  
 
k:  
- Explanation: We went from state F to state H, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state D.  
 
- Assumption:  Because of the Denial-of-Service attack some processes of the CRM 




- Explanation: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from state H. 
 
- Assumption: We use fax machines or other equipments to inform new clients and 
supplier about the problem and try to collect the orders manually. The orders will then 
later be registered in the CRM-system and the bill will be sent after this. This is not 
the ideal situation for the firm, but this is done for important customers and orders. 






Figure 5-14: Section four of the second sub state diagram 
 
 
State H: Orders are not getting through, everything integrated to is affected 
 
m:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for staying at state H. We see that state H is the last state, 
and it is only possible to go back. 
 











Figure 5-15: Section one of the third sub state diagram 
 
 
State B: External threat 




- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state B to state E. 
 
- Assumption: External threat exploits a weakness in the OS and tries to take control 
over the firewall. This is possible maximum 8 times per year. 
 
c:  
- Explanation: We went from state B to state E, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state B.  
 
- Assumption: There is a possibility that the hacker has not the ability to fully exploit the 
OS problem, and therefore is kicked out of the system. Or the OS gets a blue screen 
due to the possible exploit and reboots, the hacker is then again kicked out of the 
system, maximum 3 times. 
 
b:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state B to state E, because it was not 
possible.  
 







Figure 5-16: Section two of the third sub state diagram 
 
 
State E: Hacker attack 
State F: Problems with mail 
 
d:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state E to state F. 
 
- Assumption: The hacker attack is shutting down the firewall which then creates mail 
problems. The mail problems maximum to occur is 7 times.  
 
f and g:  
- Explanation for f: We went from state E to state F, but because of some sort of 
security mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state E.  
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-  Explanation for g: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from 
state F. 
 
- Assumption: When there has been a total failure of the firewall, we will be having 
problems with mail. Normally the firewall functions as a front-end server and it scans 
all incoming and outgoing e-mail for virus and spam, in addition to a DNS server. We 
have these scenarios because the way the infrastructure is configured.  
 
o Scenario 1: Total mail server crash.  
 
o Scenario 2: Incoming mail will function ( g ).  
 
o Scenario 3: Outgoing mail will be pending and waiting for the firewall ( f ) 
 
g and f cannot be higher then d. We assume that g is 2 times and f is 3 times 
 
e:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state E to state F, and not going back 
from state E to state B.  
 










- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state F to state H. 
 
- Assumption:  Mail problems lead to this and this can occur maximum of 6 times. 
 
j: 
- Explanation: We went from state F to state H, but some security mechanism sent us 
back to state F. 
 
- Assumption:  In this scenario our CRM system is queuing the mails and waiting for it 
to start again. This can occur maximum 2 times.  
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i:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state F to state H, and not going back 
from state F to state D, state A and state E.   
 




- Explanation: We went from state F to state H, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state E.  
 
- Assumption:  We assume that the CRM system has to get external data, and since the 
firewall is down, we do not have the correct tcp/ip connections, and therefore the 
CRM system will wait for the firewall to go up. This can occur maximum 1 times. 
 
l:  
- Explanation: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from state H. 
 
- Assumption: We use fax machines or other equipments to inform new clients and 
supplier about the problem and try to collect the orders manually. The orders will then 
later be registered in the CRM-system and the bill will be sent after this. This is not 
the ideal situation for the firm, but this is done for important customers and orders. 










State H: Orders are not getting through, everything integrated to is affected 
 
m:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for staying at state H. We see that state H is the last state, 
and it is only possible to go back. 
 
















Figure 5-19: Section one of the fourth sub state diagram 
 










State E: Hacker attack 
State G: Monitoring the traffic from inside and getting inside information 
 
d:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state E to state G. 
 
- Assumption: The firewall can be used for further intrusion. This can occur maximum 
of  5 times. 
f and g:  
- Explanation f: We went from state E to state G, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state E.  
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- Explanation g: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from state 
G. 
 
- Assumption:  Since we have an infrastructure that does not allow somebody to log in 
to the system from the internet for a long period of time. If the hackers is in the system 
for more then 5 minutes he is automatically kicked out. If the hacker is not able to shut 
down this security mechanism he is kicked out of the system ( g ). The hacker has 
been able to shut down this security feature, but has not been able to install any 
software to monitor the traffic ( f ). The maximum of occurrences for f is 2 times and 
for g is 2 times. 
e:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state E to state G, and not going back 
from state E to state B. There can be many reasons for this not to occur.  
 






Figure 5-21: Section three of the fourth sub state diagram 
 
 
State G: Monitoring the traffic from inside and therefore getting inside information 




h and j:  
- Explanation h: The likelihood for going from state G to state I. 
 
- Explanation j: We went from state G to state I, but some security mechanism sent us 
back to state G. 
 
- The hacker is inside the system and monitoring the traffic, but there are not so many 
occasions where information sent between the systems that the hacker can use for bad 
publicity. The number of times he is successful in getting information is ( h ) and 
occurs maximum of 3 times, but much of the information is not useful and he/she is 
only successful maximum 2 time ( j ). 
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i:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state G to state I, and going back from 
state G to state E and state B.   
 
- Calculation: i = 1 - h - f - g  
k:  
- Explanation: We went from state G to state I, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state E.  
 
- Assumption:  If the user is success in shutting down the 5 minute limit for external 
connections and has collected some internal information, then we do not have any 
security mechanism to kick out the hacker from the system. This can not occur in our 
system, so we can not simulate this path. We will add 0 as the likelihood for this to 




- Explanation: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from state I. 
 






Figure 5-22: Section four of the fourth sub state diagram 
 




- Explanation: The likelihood for staying at state I. We see that state I is the last state, 
and it is only possible to go back. 
 
- Calculation: m = 1 – j – k – l 
 
 
Fifth sub state diagram 
 
First and second section is the same as in the third sub state diagram. So we will simulate 




Figure 5-23: Section three of the fifth sub state diagram 
 
 
State G: Monitoring the traffic from inside and getting inside information 
State J: Disclosure of plans 
 
 
h and j:  
- Explanation: The likelihood for going from state G to state J. 
 
- The hacker is inside the system and monitoring the traffic, but there are some 
occasions where there are sent sensitive information between users that the hacker can 
use for disclosing of plans. The number of times he is successful in getting 
information is ( h ) and occurs maximum of 4 times. Some times the information is 
not useful and he/she is only successful maximum 1 time ( j ). 
 
i:   
- Explanation: The likelihood for not going from state G to state J, and going back from 
state G to state E and state B.   
 
- Calculation: i = 1- h – f - g  
 
k:  
- Explanation: We went from state G to state J, but because of some sort of security 
mechanism we were thrown out and sent back to state E.  
 
- Assumption:  If the user is success in shutting down the 5 minute limit for external 
connections and has collected some internal information, then we do not have any 
security mechanism to kick out the hacker from the system. This can not occur in our 
system, so we can not simulate this path. We will add 0 as the likelihood for this to 
occur in our calculation later. 
 
l: 
- Explanation: The security mechanism sent us all the way back to state B from state J. 
 




















- Explanation: The likelihood for staying at state J. We see that state J is the last state, 
and it is only possible to go back. 
 




5.2 Applying Markov chains to calculate the probability 
 
We have simulated and calculated the likelihood for each section for all sub state diagrams. 
We know have to apply Markov chains to calculate the probability. In this thesis we are going 
to calculate the probability for the first sub state diagram in this thesis to show how this 
works. The rest of the sub state diagrams can also be simulated and calculated, but we have 
chosen not to show this. The reason beyond this is to give the readers the opportunity to test 
our simulation tool. When simulating, the reader can use the user manual and make use of the 
assumptions made earlier for the rest of the sub state machines. 
 
We will calculate the probability by going from state A → state H.  We will be using three 
different amounts of steps, this to show that the probability changes when we apply more and 
more steps. The lowest amounts of steps are those taken from the CORAS threat diagram 
(figure 4-16), which are 3-steps. Then we will apply 5-steps, and in the last 6-steps. The more 
steps we apply the more use of the absorbing and reverse likelihood we do. We will then see 
what the probability is when only using those likelihoods that are from paths that are included 
in the CORAS threat diagram, and how the probability differs when we use more steps. 
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When making the transition matrix for Markov chains, we use Chapman-Kolmogorov 
equation [2].  
P(n) = P(n-s) P(s) 
Because P(1) = P follows from the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation that P(2) =P2 and in 
general, P(n)=Pn. The n-step transition matrix P(n) is just the nth power of P. The elements of 
Pn are the n-step transition probabilities, P(n)ij. 
 
 
We have used the program Maple 11.0 [16] when making the transition matrix. Here we can 
make a transition matrix, insert the values, set amount of steps to be used, and it will calculate 
for all possible sequences. We will use this program to find all the possibilities for a given 
sequence, state A → state H, with a specified amount of steps. We will not insert the 
calculated values from the simulation, but we will make the transition matrix using the names 
of the paths, ex. a, b, c, etc. This will give us an equation where we can insert the values later 
and calculate the probability. The equations we got from using Maple 11.0 are explained 
below, and we have inserted these in our simulation tool. If there are many states and we want 
to find the probability in different amount of steps using Markov chains, it is easier to use a 
Math program as Maple 11.0 to find the exact sequence of the equation. 
 
It is important to remember that if the reader wants to find the probability for some other 
scenarios, for example state C → state H, then he/she must use Maple 11.0 to find the 
sequences equation. Then they can insert the calculate values from the simulation to find the 
probability for going from state C → state H. 
 
We have inserted the paths equation we got from Maple 11.0 in our simulation tool, so when 
it calculates the probability using Markov chains it uses those equations. 
 
In Maple 11.0 the transition matrix made is the opposite manner then we have used in our 




The explanation for this matrix in plain text is:  
Matrix ({(1, 1) = m[1, 1], (1, 2) = m[1, 2], (2, 1) = m[2, 1], (2, 2) = m[2, 2]}) 
 




The explanation for this matrix in plain text is:  
Matrix ({(1, 1) = m[1, 1], (2, 1) = m[2, 1],  (1, 2) = m[1, 2], (2, 2) = m[2, 2]}) 
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It is allowed to use both methods when making the transition matrix. Since we now will use 
the answers from Maple program we will be making the matrix in the same manner (like 
matrix 1). 
 
To understand how we take out the selected sequence that we have decided to apply Markov 
chains to, we look at this example: 
 
 
Figure 5-25: Example of a sub state diagram 
 
 
We want to find the probability from state 1 → state 2, by using 2-steps. 








i. The sequence for going from state 1 → state 1, in 2-steps: 
[a2 + bc] 
 
ii. The sequence for going from state 1 → state 2, in 2-steps: 
[ab + bd] 
 
iii. The sequence for going from state 2 → state 1, in 2-steps: 
[ca + dc] 
 
iv. The sequence for going from state 2 → state 2, in 2-steps: 
[bc + d2] 
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We see that to calculate the probability from state 1 → state 2 we have to use the sequence 
given in ii.  
 
We use this same method when finding the sequence for probability calculation from  
state A → state H.  
 




The explaination of this transition matrix in plain text: 
 
Matrix({(1, 1) = m[1, 1], (1, 2) = m[1, 2], (1, 3) = m[1, 3], (1, 4) = m[1, 4], (2, 1) = m[2, 1], 
(2, 2) = m[2, 2], (2, 3) = m[2, 3], (2, 4) = m[2, 4], (3, 1) = m[3, 1], (3, 2) = m[3, 2], (3, 3) = 
m[3, 3], (3, 4) = m[3, 4], (4, 1) = m[4, 1], (4, 2) = m[4, 2], (4, 3) = m[4, 3], (4, 4) = m[4, 
4]}) 
 




The textual explanation: 
 
Matrix ({(A, A) = b, (A, C) = a, (A, F) = 0, (A, H) = 0, (C, A) = c, (C, C) = e,  
(C, F) = d, (C, H) = 0, (F, A) = g, (F, C) = f, (F, F) = i, (F, H) = h, (H, A) = l, 
(H, C) = k, (H, F) = j, (H, H) = m}) 
 





The different sequences we get are: 
  
 
This answer is divided in this manner: 
i. The sequence for going from state A → state A, in 3-steps: 
[ (b2 + ac)b + (ba + ae)c + a d g ] 
 
ii. The sequence for going from state A → state C, in 3-steps: 
[ (b2 + ac)a + (ba + ae)e + a d f ] 
 
iii. The sequence for going from state A → state F, in 3-steps: 
[ (ba + ae)d + a d i ] 
 
iv. The sequence for going from state A → state H, in 3-steps: 
[  a d h ] 
 
It is sequence iv we were looking for. This is inserted in our simulation tool.  
 
The rest of the sequences are not of interest to us, but to give a clarification of what sequences 
they represent we can give an explanation:  
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[state C → state A,  state C → state C,  state C→  state F,  state C → state H],  
[state F → state A,  state F → state C,  state F → state F,  state F → state H],  
[state H → state A,  state H → state C,  state H → state F,  state H → state H] 
 
 
In the rest of the thesis we will only be showing the sequence from state A → state H we have 
found through using Maple program.  
 





The sequence from state A → state H: 
 










The sequence from state A → state H: 
 
[ ((b2 + ac)b + (ba + ae)c + adg) adh + ((b2 + ac)a + (ba + ae)e + adf) ((ed + di)h  + dhm) + 
((ba + ae)d + adi) ((df + i2 + hj)h + (ih + hm)m) + adh((kd + ji + mj)h + (hj + m2) m) ] 
 
 
5.2.1 The result 
 
When we entered the values of our assumptions for the first sub state diagram, these are the 





We can see that the likelihood for h is in the region of what was given in our threat diagram. 
The result could have been more precise if we had the possibility to test this for an existent 
company. Then we could compare the simulation result with exact numbers of likelihood. 
 
Post Service is a fictitious company, but the scenarios, likelihoods and assumptions we have 
made are relatively realistic. The scenarios, likelihoods and assumptions are made by 
brainstorming on what is actually possible in real life. This is why the answer we get from our 
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simulation tool can be looked as valid. 
 





These answers do not only show us that the probability varies when we change the amount of 
steps, they also show how the probability actually changes.  
This is Markov chains´ distinctive ability, and it makes our probability calculations more 
reliable and efficient. We can find the exact probability for a given scenario for any given 




6. Simulation tool 
 
We made the simulation tool in active server page (ASP) programming language, where we 
have simulated using the built in randomization function, to give us random number of attacks 
in the boundaries defined by the user. The average is then calculated and shown for each step. 
We use this average as the likelihood for each path and can insert it into the sub state diagram 
to have a better overview.  
 
We have inserted all the rules that are needed for simulating the values for this case study.  
It takes the assumption inserted into it and simulates according to them. We check if any of 
the given assumption does breach some of our rules. If it does we give an error message 
telling what went wrong. It calculates the absorbing likelihoods, b, d, i, after having simulated 
the first values. If we then get a negative answer in the absorbing likelihood we get an error 
message telling which one is of negative value. We then have to start the simulation again 
manually, because this indicates that something was wrong with our assumptions. 
  
Since this is a beta version, the simulation software is customized to the case study model. 
 
Since this is a web-application our tool can be found using this URL: 
http://www.semat.no/simulering/  
 
User manual explains how this simulation tool should be used. 
 
The simulation tool can be developed further to a more general simulation tool, so that the 
number of states and paths can be made as needed. There should be done more work on the 
interface of the program and the way it presents the results.  
 
The simulation tools source code can be found under Appendix B. 
 
Recommendations for feature development: 
 
• Make the simulation tool more general to make it able to handle more states and paths 






We have seen how CORAS analysis is build and how it is deployed. Our main area in 
CORAS analysis has been the CORAS threat diagrams. We have shown through its semantics 
the rules for them and how they should be interpreted. This is where thought Markov chains 
could be suitable. The reason for this is that Markov chains are used to calculate the 
probability, and in CORAS analysis the main section for this is the threat diagram.  
 
The way CORAS threat diagrams are build, its rules and regulations, it was not possible to 
deploy Markov chains directly with out any changes. Markov chains are used, in simple 
words, to find likelihood from one state to another. To do this it is essential that the likelihood 
is given for the different states to occur.  
 
The second part was that to get full utilization of Markov chains then much other likelihood 
paths must also be known. In Markov chains it is possible for a state to point back to all of the 
previous states, to point back to it self, and to point to all of the next states. All of these paths 
can then have likelihoods, and these likelihoods can be used in the calculation of probability. 
These paths are not a part of the CORAS analysis, since CORAS is not a direct transcription 
of how the system runs, but it tells how a threat will behave and affect the system. The basis 
for the CORAS analysis is the brainstorming and historical data phase. The CORAS threat 
diagram tells where the vulnerabilities lay, and how they can be utilized by a threat. The 
threat can then lead to threat scenarios and unwanted incidents that affect the assets we want 
to protect. CORAS threat diagrams does not include if the system has the possibility to go 
back to a previous state, if a threat scenario or an unwanted incident occurs. The way CORAS 
threat diagrams are set up is not in the ideal manner for Markov chains, and it was a challenge 
in it self to separate it to able to fully use Markov chains. 
 
If we applied Markov chains directly to CORAS threat diagram, there where two scenarios: 
The first was that the likelihood for the paths was not given and it was therefore impossible to 
calculate. The second scenario was that the likelihood given was linguistic and not numerical. 
The linguistic likelihood is again not useable if we wanted to apply Markov chains directly to 
CORAS threat diagram. If it was numerical likelihood we could apply Markov chains. The 
testing showed us that the only result we got was that we multiplied the given numerical 
likelihoods with each other. The use of probability matrix and applying the equations to 
calculate the probability only did this. The reason was that all of the other likelihoods that 
were essential to take full advantage of Markov chains where missing, and we had to assume 
that they were unknown. –Then why use Markov chains to calculate this simple equation? 
Neither did we fully use the full potential of Markov chains. We have to use a lot of time to 
make the probability matrix and insert the numbers in the equation, to just multiply the given 
likelihood in the end. The only solution to this was that is has to be made some changes 
before applying Markov chains. And if we wanted to make some changes then these changes 
must lead to full advantage of the potential Markov chains actually possess. These changes 
must also be in a matter that we preserve the essential in the CORAS threat diagrams, and at 
the same time introduce what is needed for Markov chains. 
 
To find those paths that Markov chains can use we have to go back to the system, the 
brainstorming and historical data phase. We had to see how the system reacts when a threat 
that exploits those vulnerabilities in the system is introduced. We knew that CORAS threat 
diagram has a fixed path, therefore we would not look at the possibility that a state could 
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jump over a state and point to the next. Then it would be possible to lead to a next phase 
without exploiting a given vulnerability or a threat scenario. All these option are highly 
reflected in CORAS threat diagram. We decided that the paths and scenarios given in the 
CORAS threat diagram will not be questioned, because they are well evaluated and we would 
be testing something that is not decisive to our thesis. 
 
We had to again look at the brainstorming and historical data phase, and simulate the system 
with respect to the CORAS threat diagram. We must simulate how the system will react when 
the scenarios given in the CORAS threat diagram happens. The result we are looking for is 
likelihoods for those paths that are needed for Markov chains. It is not for sure that all those 
paths we need are possible in the given system, and then we devote the likelihood of 0 for 
those paths when we insert them into Markov chains. The simulation gives also possibility to 
compare the result we get with the likelihood we have in the CORAS threat diagram. This can 
be seen as how effective the simulation went. 
 
In our thesis we have used an algorithm when simulating. This algorithm takes our 
assumption and then calculates the likelihood. The algorithm does a random test to the given 
assumption. The main aspect in the simulation will always be the assumption. The assumption 
must be made through collecting all data of the system runs, the security mechanisms that are 
present in the system and how much they can help. If the assumptions made are not correct 
then we will not get correct answers. If we have some given likelihoods in the CORAS threat 
diagram then they can be compared to see how correct the simulated answer it is. If the given 
likelihood in the CORAS threat diagram is of linguistic value, then the simulations answer 
can be used to set up a numerical scale of the linguistic values. 
 
We have tried to accomplish our success criteria’s for this thesis when developing this method 
when relating Markov chains and CORAS threat diagrams. Our success criteria’s were: 
 
1. The thesis should compare Markov diagrams to CORAS diagrams with value to: 
 
- Expressiveness 




We have to take look at how CORAS diagrams are built, especially CORAS threat diagrams. 
We know that CORAS diagrams are expressive with regards to that they are understandable, 
and show in diagrams where the threat can lay and what causes it can lead to. They are 
expressive also in the manner that they include an analyse team when making the diagrams, 
through brainstorming and historical data phase. CORAS diagrams probability estimation 
varies from how much information one gets from that phase, and if it is in numerical or 
linguistic value. This is the main area where it was thought that Markov chains could be a 
help. 
 
Markov chains main expressiveness lays in its probability estimation ability. It has the ability 
to take different conditions a state can be under in its calculation. The relations between the 
states and their behaviour, and the way CORAS are built with their paths from a threat to an 
unwanted incident or a threat scenario is something that can resemble each other. We have 
seen that even if they resemble each other at some manner in a way, there are some changes 
that have to be made if we want to relate them to each other. 
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There are some tools available to calculate Markov chains, but there are not any tool support 
for relating CORAS diagrams and Markov chains. Because of some differences between both   
parts it is not an easy task to relate them before making some conclusive changes.  
 
Besides proper analysis of exactly what, CORAS analysis wants to offer where the threat lays 
and how we can treat them, to show the probability for threats to occur. The purpose of 
Markov chains is to estimate the probability, and as we have said earlier this is where Markov 
chains can be a help for CORAS analysis. 
 
 
2. The thesis should deliver a method integrating Markov analysis in risk analysis based 
on CORAS diagrams: 
 
• Makes it more reliable 
• Makes it more efficient 
• Gives more benefit on probability estimation  
 
Our first interest was to apply Markov chains without making these changes. The likelihood is 
not always given in the CORAS threat diagram, but when it is given it can either be in 
linguistic or numerical value. When the likelihoods are not given or are in linguistic values 
then it is not possible to use Markov chains. Markov chains have its set of rules that also 
make us split the CORAS threat diagram. If the likelihood is given for all paths, and we apply 
Markov chains to calculate the probability we end up with only multiplying these values with 
each other. This is straightforward calculation of the probability and we do not need to 
introduce Markov chains to calculate this. It means that we have to go back to brainstorming 
and historical data phase and try to make a simulation of the system. There are rules that must 
be followed when simulating so we preserve both he basis of CORAS threat diagram, and 
what is needed to use Markov chains. The simulation must try to be done by looking at the 
paths and scenarios of the CORAS threat diagram.   
 
We have tried to deliver a method of how Markov chains can be used in risk analysis based 
on CORAS diagrams. We have seen through our simulation and using the calculated values 
that it is possible to get reliable and competent calculations of the probability. This simulation 
lets us find the likelihoods we need for the use of Markov chains, and then use them for the 
calculation of the probability. The simulation has its basis in the CORAS threat diagram, so 
we have tried to preserve the idea of CORAS analysis in our simulation tool. We had to add 
new paths which were not part of CORAS threat diagram, but were essential for Markov 
chains. These new features shows what is needed to use the full potential of Markov chains.   
 
Markov chains give the opportunity to calculate the probability in the way the system can 
behave when there is a threat, and this makes the answer more reliable. We also benefit 
because we can calculate the probability in different amount of steps of how a sequence can 
occur. Another advantage we get from introducing Markov chains is that we calculate the 
probability with much more expressiveness. We show that these are the sequences a threat 
can behave from one state to another state, depending on the amount of steps we choose to 
use.  
 
Our simulation tool is to be looked as a beta program. It has the potential to be developed 
graphically and to be used on other threat diagrams as well. The time frame we have had on 
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this thesis, and the arduousness level of Markov chains and CORAS analysis semantics has 
not made it possible to make the simulation tool at its prospective. It was a great task and trial 
in it self to find the right course to how it is possible to relate these two.  
 
In the aftermath we see that the simulation tool is something we could have developed better 
in terms of better usability and to be used on any threat diagram. It could use some further 
reconsideration on some issues. However, we have always had in mind that our goal is to find 
if and how it is possible to relate CORAS diagrams and Markov chains, and not a final 
implementation of some tool. 
 
The program simulates in an understandable manner. We have ensured that all of the 
assumptions made are used when simulating the values, and that all of the other rules are 
followed as well. We have chosen to develop the simulation tool in active server page (ASP). 
The reason for this was our background in web-programming, and because of the time frame 
it was easier to develop the simulation tool using ASP. This simulation tool is designed to be 
a beta version that can be developed further. This simulation tool demonstrates how we can 
simulate the calculated values using the assumptions, and then be able to use them in Markov 
chains. 
 
Our user manual resembles the simpleness of our simulation tool. It illustrates how to use the 




The motivation behind this thesis was how to make the probability estimation enhanced in 
CORAS analysis by relating CORAS diagrams and Markov chains. We limited our scope by 
looking at the differences and resembles between them, and how it is possible to relate them. 
We found that CORAS threat diagram is where the prospective is to introduce Markov chains. 
 
The method we have developed captures the basis of CORAS threat diagram and introduces 
the Markov chains to it. We have based our research on capturing the features of Markov 
chains, and have tried to introduce this when we want to use Markov chains to calculate the 
probability in CORAS diagrams. The solution we saw for this is by simulating the system on 
the basis of the CORAS threat diagram. In the simulation we must present the new paths for 
each state that is needed to use Markov chain probability calculation. The simulation is based 
on assumptions made by looking at the historical data of the system, and going through 
brainstorming phase. These assumptions must be accurate, if not we end up with wrong 
answers.  
 
The simulation tool that is made shows how the simulation is done, and how the answers 




8.1 Future Work 
 
From a narrow perspective, future work should consist of solidification of the work presented 
in this thesis. Investigating how to combine the simulation of the system with CORAS 
diagrams. Using CORAS diagrams to show where the threats lay, how they affect the system, 
and how it can be treated. And then use this as a basis when simulating the system and use the 
given values to calculate the probability with Markov chains. 
 
Markov chains have the potential to enhance the probability estimation of CORAS diagram. 
We know that Markov chains need the absorbing and reverse likelihood in order to use its full 
potential. These paths likelihoods are not included in the CORAS diagrams. The other 
approach to look for future research is changing the matter CORAS threat diagrams are made 
by, and try to include the features needed for Markov chains in it. This will require changes in 
the way CORAS diagrams are made today. 
 
It is also possible to look at other probability estimation methods that could be included, that 
do not need these changes. We know through this thesis that to calculate the probability using 
any other probability estimation methods we need the likelihood for each path. So the first 
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Discrete time Markov chains 
 
[2] 
Reducible / irreducible:  
If there is only one communication class, then the Markov chain is irreducible, but if there is 
more than one communication class, then the Markov chain is reducible. 
 
Communication classes:  
The set of equivalence classes in a discrete time Markov chain are called the communication 
classes or classes of the Markov chain. 
If every state in the Markov chain can be reached from every other state, then there is only 
one communication class (all the states are in the same class) 
 
Periodic / aperodic: 
The period of state i, denoted as d(i), is the greatest common divisor of all integers n ≥ 1 
for which p(n)ii > 0; that is: 
 
d(i) = g.c.d{n|p(n)ii > 0 and n ≥ 1} 
 
If a state i has a period of d(i) > 1, it is said to be periodic of period d(i). If the period 












It is easy to see that there are three communication classes, {1}, {2}, and {3}. The value of 
d(i) = 0 for i = 1, 2 because p(n)ii = 0 for i = 1, 2 and n = 1, 2,…. Also, 






Recurrent / transient: 
State i is transient if . State i is recurrent if . 
If state i is recurrent, then the set defines a probability distribution for the random 
variable representing the first return time. When state i is transient, , does not 
define a complete set of probabilities necessary to define a probability distribution. 
 
 
Continuous time Markov chains 
[2] 
 
Reducible / irreducible: 
 
Same definition as in discrete. If every state can be reached from every other state, it is 
irreducible; otherwise it is reducible. 
 
Periodic / aperodic: 
 
There is no concept of periodic and aperiodic in continuous time Markov chains because the 
intervened time is random. 
 
Recurrent / transient: 
 
The definition is the same as in discrete time Markov chains. 
 
State i is recurrent (transient) in a continuous time Markov chain {X(t)}, t ≥ 0, if the 
first return time is finite (infinite), 
 




Appendix B  
 
<p><img border="0" src="images/simulering_1.gif"></p> 
<p>&nbsp;</p> 
 






<form method="POST" action="sim1.asp"> 
<table border="0" width="100%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
<tr> 
 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="13%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Simulation period</td> 
 <td width="35%"> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td colspan="5"><br> 
 Number of accurrences</td> 
</tr> 
<tr> 
 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">Phase A-C ( a )</td> 
 <td width="13%"> 
 <input type="text" name="attacks_ac" size="7" 
value="<%=request.form("attacks_ac")%>"></td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Phase C-A ( c )</td> 
 <td width="35%"> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">Phace C-F ( d )</td> 
 <td width="13%"> 
 <input type="text" name="attacks_cf" size="7" 
value="<%=request.form("attacks_cf")%>"></td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Phase F-C ( f )</td> 
 <td width="35%"> 
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 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="13%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Phase F-A ( g ) </td> 
 <td width="35%"> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">Phase F-H ( h ) </td> 
 <td width="13%"> 
 <input type="text" name="attacks_fh" size="7" 
value="<%=request.form("attacks_fh")%>"></td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Phase H-F ( j ) </td> 
 <td width="35%"> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="13%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Phase H-C ( k )</td> 
 <td width="35%"> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="13%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="27%">Phase H-A ( l )</td> 
 <td width="35%"> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="20%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="13%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="1%">&nbsp;</td> 
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 <td width="27%">&nbsp;</td> 




 <td width="3%">&nbsp;</td> 
 <td width="96%" colspan="5"> 
 <font color="#FF0000">* Rules from the thesis<br> 



















aValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_ac")) 
cValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_ca")) 
dValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_cf")) 
fValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_fc")) 
gValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_fa")) 
hValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_fh")) 
jValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_hf")) 
kValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_hc")) 
lValue = cInt(request.form("attacks_ha")) 
 
 
'validate number of days 
If (dager<>"" and dager>0) Then 
'rule checks 
 















error = true 




error = true 




error = true 




error = true 




error = true 
errorstring = errorstring & "The assumption for l is greater than the assumption for h <br>" 
end if 
 
if (gValue>dValue) then 
error = true 
errorstring = errorstring & "The assumption for g is greater than the assumption for d<br>" 
end if 
 
if((fValue + gValue)>dValue) then 
error = true 
errorstring = errorstring & "The sum of the assumption for f and g is greater than the 
assumption for d<br>" 
end if 
 
if((jValue + kValue + lValue)>hValue) then 
error = true 
errorstring = errorstring & "The sum of the assumption for j,k and l is greater than the 







error = true 




error = true 




error = true 




error = true 





 if(error=false) then 
 
 'Get assumptions 
 fa = (RandomNumber(aValue,aValue,dager,"a")) 
 fc = (RandomNumber(cValue,aValue,dager,"c")) 
 fd = (RandomNumber(dValue,aValue,dager,"d")) 
 ff = (RandomNumber(fValue,dValue,dager,"f")) 
 fh = (RandomNumber(hValue,dValue,dager,"h")) 
 fj = (RandomNumber(jValue,hValue,dager,"j")) 
 fk = (RandomNumber(kValue,hValue,dager,"k")) 
 fg = (RandomNumber(gValue,dValue,dager,"g")) 
 fl = (RandomNumber(lValue,hValue,dager,"l")) 
 








 aValue = cDbl(getNumber(fa)) 
 bValue = 1- cDbl(getNumber(fa)) 
 cValue = cDbl(getNumber(fc)) 
 dValue = cDbl(getNumber(fd)) 
 eValue = 1 - cDbl(getNumber(fd)) - cDbl(getnumber(fc)) 
 fValue = cDbl(getNumber(ff)) 
 gValue = cDbl(getNumber(fg)) 
 hValue = cDbl(getNumber(fh)) 
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 iValue = 1 - cLng(getnumber(fh))- cDbl(getnumber(ff)) - cDbl(getNumber(fg)) 
 jValue = cDbl(getNumber(fj)) 
 kValue = cDbl(getNumber(fk)) 
 lValue = cDbl(getNumber(fl)) 
 mValue = 1 - cLng(getNumber(fj)) - cDbl(getNumber(fk))- cDbl(getNumber(fl)) 
 
 response.write("b : " & bValue & "<br>") 
 response.write("e : " & eValue & "<br>") 
 response.write("i ; " & iValue & "<br>") 
 response.write("m : " & mValue & "<br>") 
 
 if(bValue<0) then 
  response.write("<br>b less then 0<br>") 
 end if 
 
 if(eValue<0) then 
  response.write("<br>e less then 0<br>") 
 end if 
 
 if(iValue<0) then 
  response.write("<br>i less then 0<br>") 
 end if 
 
 if(mValue<0) then 
  response.write("<br>m less then 0<br>") 
 end if 
 
 
 response.write("<p><h4>Calculating the probability from State A -> State H, using 
Markov chains:</h4>") 
 
 response.write("In 3-steps: ") 
 response.write(aValue * dValue * hValue) 
 response.write("<br>In 5 steps: ") 
 response.write(((bValue*bValue + aValue*cValue)*aValue*dValue + 
(bValue*aValue + aValue*eValue)* (eValue*dValue + dValue*iValue) + 
aValue*dValue*(dValue*f + iValue*iValue + hValue*jValue))*hValue + ((bValue*aValue + 
aValue*eValue)*dValue*hValue + aValue*dValue*(iValue*hValue + 
hValue*mValue))*mValue) 
 response.write("<br>In 6 steps: ") 
 response.write(((bValue*bValue + aValue*cValue)*bValue +(bValue*aValue + 
aValue*eValue)*cValue + aValue*dValue*gValue)*aValue*dValue*hValue + 
((bValue*bValue + aValue*cValue)*aValue + (bValue*aValue + aValue*eValue)*eValue + 
aValue*dValue*fValue)*((eValue*dValue + dValue*iValue)*hValue  + 
dValue*hValue*mValue) + ((bValue*aValue + aValue*eValue)*dValue + 
aValue*dValue*iValue)*((dValue*fValue +iValue*iValue + hValue*jValue)*hValue + 
(iValue*hValue + hValue*mValue)*mValue) + aValue*dValue*hValue*((k*dValue + 
































for i=1 to dager 
valueTable = valueTable & "<td><table width=""20"">" 
Randomize() 
rndValue= int(rnd() * (intHighestNumber+1)) 
 
valuetable = valuetable & "<tr><td>" & rndValue & "/" & ofValue & "</td></tr>" 
valuetable = valuetable & "<tr><td>" & i & "</td></tr>" 
valueSum= valueSum+ (rndValue/ofValue) 
 




endTable = "</tr></table>" 
 
RandomNumber=starttable & valueTable & endTable & " " & sValue & " value : " & 






User manual  
 
 
This user manual guides the user through the steps which are required to perform a simulation 
to determine the likelihood values, after the assumption values have been inserted for the 
particular phases in a state diagram. This process will be done through running a web 
application running which can be accessed on the URL: 
http://www.semat.no/simulering/   
 
Following describes the user steps:  
 
1. Running the application 
Open a web browser, i.e. Internet Explorer or Mozilla Firefox and enter the URL: 
http://www.semat.no/simulering/   
 
2. Choosing a state diagram 
A page with the particular state diagram will be listed (figure 1), please select det state 






Figure 1: Selecting a sub state diagram 
 
3. Fill inn assumption values 
When a state diagram has been selected, a form will be displayed on the next 
page(figure 2) . 
Please fill inn the assumption fields according to the rules from the thesis. These rules 
are will be displayed marked with red under the assumption fields. If invalid values 




































4. Displaying the result 
       
When pressed the simulate button, the values are been passed to the application and the 
likelihoods are calculated and the result values are shown as the illustrated on the next 
page. 








Fill inn simulation period






















































Likelihood for phase a
Likelihood for phase c
Likelihood for phase d
Likelihood for phase f
Likelihood for phase h
Likelihood for phase j
Likelihood for phase k
Likelihood for phase g
Likelihood for phase l
Likelihood for phase b, e, i, m
The total probability, using Markov chains
